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PRODUCT LIABILITY ISSUES IN MASS
TORTS - VIEW FROM THE BENCH
Hon. Helen E. Freedman'
Introduction
This paper is designed to give a brief overview of some of the
product liability issues relevant to mass torts, from a judge's
perspective. What is a mass tort and how does a judge identify
one?1 When a summary judgment motion in a tort action brings
hundreds of lawyers into the courtroom, a judge should suspect
that a mass tort has arrived.
Traditionally, a mass disaster such as a plane or train crash, an
explosion, a water main break, a site contamination or an oil spill
produces a large number of lawsuits, thus becoming a mass tort.2
Events of this nature usually take place in a confined area, and a
single judge who sits in a court near where the disaster occurred
easily manages cases. The claims in these cases are usually
grounded in negligence, although strict liability claims (based on
inherently dangerous object or design defect) are sometimes
included.3
During the last twenty-five years, a new type of mass tort, often
national in scope, has emerged. In these cases, plaintiffs have
* Justice Freedman is an Associate Justice of the New York State Supreme
Court, Appellate Term, First Department.
I See generally Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts and
"Settlement Class Actions": An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 811 (1995);
see also William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order
Out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837 (1995).
2 See, e.g., Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Howard M. Erichson, Modern Mass
Tort Litigation, Prior-Action Depositions and Practice-Sensitive Procedure,
63 FORDHAM L. REv. 989, 1031 (1995) (listing as possible mass torts the Pan
Am Lockerbie air crash litigation, the World Trade Center bombing litigation,
the Union Carbide Bhopal gas disaster litigation, the Agent Orange litigation,
the repetitive stress injury litigation, the Bjork-Shiley heart valve litigation, the
tobacco litigation, and the Sioux City air crash litigation).
3 See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective
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claimed that toxic substances, toxic pharmaceuticals or defective
devices have been put into the stream of commerce causing harm
either in the short or long run to individuals who either ingest the
drug, are exposed to the substance, or are implanted with the
device.
Examples of allegedly toxic pharmaceuticals, are DES
(diethylstilbestrol), DPT vaccine, and fen-phen.4  Toxic
substances include dioxins (agent orange), polyclorinated
biphenyls (PCBs), asbestos, lead or contaminated albuterol.'
Devices and implants include silicone breast and penile implants,
Norplant, the Shiley heart valve, and the Dalkon Shield
intrauterine device (IUD).6 Additionally, repetitive stress
injuries caused by allegedly improperly designed keyboards or
ergonomically deficient products have been cast as a mass tort.7
Most, but not all, of the cases involving toxic substances are
brought on a failure to warn or its subset, failure to properly test,
theory.
I. AGGREGATION AND COORDINATION
Aggregation of mass tort cases for pretrial handling has become
the norm in many jurisdictions. Cases in the federal judicial
system are usually consolidated before a single judge pursuant to
an order of the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation.
' See, e.g., Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Company, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539
N.E.2d 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d. 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980); Enright v. Eli Lilly
and Company, 77 N.Y.2d 377, 570 N.E.2d 198, 568 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1991).
5 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp.
1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997);
White v. Celotex Corporation, 907 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1990); Georgine v.
Amchem, 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) aff'd sub nom. Amchem Products, Inc.
v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
6 See, e.g., In re New York State Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 166
Misc. 2d 85, 631 N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1995); Lee v.
Baxter Health Care Corporation, 898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990).
7 See Blanco v. AT&T Co., 90 N.Y.2d 757, 689 N.E.2d 506, 666
N.Y.S.2d. 536 (1997); Edmond v. IBM Corp., 91 N.Y.2d. 949, 694 N.E.2d
438, 671 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1998).
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Asbestos cases are before Honorable Charles Weiner of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, silicone gel breast implant cases
are before Honorable Sam Pointer of Alabama, Norplant cases
are before Honorable Richard Schell of Texas, and fen-phen
cases are before Honorable Louis Bechtle of the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania.
Many state courts have also consolidated cases for pretrial
management either locally or on a statewide basis. All New York
City asbestos personal injury cases and all New York State breast
implant and fen-phen cases are currently consolidated and have
been assigned to me for pre-trial management. There are
approximate 13,000 asbestos cases and 800 breast implants cases
pending. I have already resolved about 8,000 asbestos and a
substantial number of breast implant cases through trial or
settlement.'
There are numerous advantages to consolidation. First, the
judge who handles the cases develops expertise so that each time
a motion or application comes, he or she does not have to
reinvent the wheel. Rulings are also far more likely to be
consistent. Second, management is more efficient. Usually, the
parties and judge develop a case management order (CMO) that
provides among other things for uniform pleadings,
interrogatories, and approaches to discovery. The judge usually
appoints lead or liaison counsel and/or steering committees,
representatives of each or all sides, to present arguments,
distribute orders, establish schedules and coordinate discovery. If
document depositories are established or legal-medical records
services are utilized or new technologies are othervise applied,
liaison counsel are usually responsible for insuring access to all
I In re New York City Asbestos Litigation (Brooklyn Navy Shipyard Cases),
151 Misc. 2d 1, 572 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1991),
modified, 188 A.D.2d 214, 593 N.Y.S.2d 43, (Ist Dept.), afrd, 82 N.Y.2d
821, 625 N.E.2d 588, 605 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1993); Campo v. Asbestospray
Corporation, 139 Misc. 2d 353, 527 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1988); Weitzman v. Eagle-Picher Industries, et. al., 144 Misc. 2d 42,
542 N.Y.S.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1989); Fusaro v. Porter-
Hayden Company, 145 Misc. 2d 911, 548 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1989), aft'd, 170 A.D.2d 239, 565 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Ist Dept. 1991).
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parties. Consolidation also facilitates exploration of ADR
alternatives including the use of special masters for discovery,
docket management, global settlements, and distribution of
settlement proceeds. Special masters have been extremely
effective in resolving both asbestos and breast implant cases.
Finally, consolidation allows the judge in charge to coordinate
with both federal judges and state judges from other jurisdictions
who have similar cases in order to maximize efficient disposition
of cases. Depositions of experts may be attended by litigants in
federal and state courts, and, where provided for in the case
management order, state procedures may be modified; for
example, depositions from other jurisdictions may be used either
in pre-trial Daubert 9 or Frye Hearings'0 or at trial, thus
substantially reducing transaction costs. Major state-federal
coordination through class action certification has been attempted,
but thus far, with limited success in mass torts. "
There is a down side to consolidation. Increased efficiency
may encourage additional filings and provide an overly hospitable
environment for weak cases. To some extent, this is inevitable,
particularly where a limited number of plaintiffs lawyers
monopolize a particular tort. The cost of prosecuting weak cases
is minimal when volume is high. Courts have developed various
mechanisms for handling such cases by deferring weak cases or
cases that are not ripe for adjudication because scientific
causation has not been established. For example, in New York,
both the state and federal courts have put the silicone gel breast
implant cases in which the injuries claimed are systemic, on a
deferred docket pending the report concerning scientific validity
by the Panel convened pursuant to FRE 706 by Judge Pointer. In
other jurisdictions, like Illinois, asbestos victims who have no
functional impairment are placed on a "Pleural Registry." This
9 See infra note 15.
10 Id.
"' See GEORGINE VAIRO, AMCHEM PRODUCTS, INC. V. WINDSOR: WHERE
WILL THE MASS TORT CLASS ACTIONS Go?, New York Litigator 4:1 (May
1998); HELEN FREEDMAN, CLASS ACTIONS FOR MASS TORTS IN STATE
COURTS: A STATE COURT JUDGE'S RESPONSE To PROFESSOR VAIRO, New
York Litigator, 4:1 (May 1998).
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means that the claimant who has markers of asbestos exposure,
i.e., pleural thickening or plaques, but no manifest disease at the
present time must wait until such cognizable disease develops.
The statute of limitations is tolled during this time.
A mass tort judge's perspective may differ from a judge
viewing cases individually. A judge who has many cases is more
likely to consider the ramifications of particular rulings on the
entire litigation. This may even include the potential for
bankruptcy and or the likelihood of increased insurance coverage.
On the other hand, appellate courts, faced with appeals on
individual cases, tend to look at the individual case without
considering the impact of a particular ruling on the litigation as a
whole.
H. CHOICE OF LAW AND THEORY OF LIABILITY
One of the issues encountered in any consolidation that crosses
state lines is that choice of law may determine the outcome. Some
states like New Jersey have applied strict liability to asbestos
cases, on the theory that asbestos containing products were
inherently dangerous or defective. The focus is on the product
and not on the conduct. Most states, like New York, rely solely
on a failure to warn theory. Failure to warn is much closer to
negligence and, like negligence, is subject to defenses. The focus
is on conduct rather than on the product. If it was neither known
nor knowable that the product could cause injury when used in
the expected manner, the state of the art defense is available in a
failure to warn case. Culpable conduct may also be pled as an
affirmative defense.
However, although state of the art is a defense in New York,
reverse bifurcation has virtually eliminated trial of that defense.
12 Beshada v. Johns Manville Products Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982). In
applying a strict liability standard and not failure to warn, the court claimed
"we are saying that the defendant's products were not reasonably safe because
they did not have a warning." Id. at 549. New Jersey's reasoning in applying
strict liability is that it is "unfair for distributors of a defective product not to
compensate its victims." Id.
1999 689
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CPLR 4011 permits the trial judge in his or her discretion to try
any issue in any order that will facilitate resolution of the case.
In the case of a mature tort such as asbestos, where liability based
on failure to warn has been established over and over again in
cases throughout the country, particularly when the exposure
post-dated 1964, i.e. when the dangers of asbestos were
unequivocally known because of widely published studies, the
only liability issue of any value to a defendant is lack of product
identification. Therefore, summary judgment motions eliminate
most non-players, defendants whose products cannot be
identified, and damages are then tried first. By the time the
damage phase is over, just about every defendant has settled
rendering unnecessary tedious repetitive liability trials. By trying
damages first, choice of laws issues are also avoided. In a
national litigation, some plaintiffs have little or no nexus to the
state in which the action is tried. The plaintiff neither lived nor
was injured in the state, and the only link to the forum is the
residence of one or two of the defendants. In such situations, the
law of the state where the tort occurred must be applied. Reverse
bifurcation often, but not always, obviates the need to determine
which state law governs, although there may still be damage
issues that depend upon the law of the jurisdiction.
III. CAUSATION
In the "immature tort,"' 4  scientific causation must be
established before triable issues exist. The Supreme Court,
interpreting FRE 702, has determined that the trial judge acts as a
13 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4011 (McKinney 1992). This section provides "the court
may determine the sequence in which the issues shall be tried and otherwise
regulate the conduct of the trial in order to achieve a speedy and unprejudiced
disposition of the matters at a issue in a setting of proper decorum." Id.
" Francis McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L.
REv. 659 (1989). Professor McGovern distinguishes between the mature tort,
like asbestos or Dalkon Shield, where causation and liability have been
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"gatekeeper," 15 deciding, according to flexible criteria, whether
there is sufficient scientific validity to allow the jury to even hear
the expert evidence. The science must be both relevant and
reliable. The focus is on methodology rather than conclusions,
and the trial court will be reversed only if it abuses its
discretion. 16 New York, like a number of other states, adheres to
the Frye 1 7 standard, namely, that the scientific method, possibly
even the conclusion, must be generally accepted in the scientific
community. Whether the claim is asserted in a Daubert or a Frye
jurisdiction, it has become increasingly common to hold
preliminary hearings to determine admissibility of scientific
evidence and/or qualification of particular experts to give that
evidence in new tort actions. Even in mature torts, such hearings
may be appropriate. For example, while the epidemiological
basis for causation of many asbestos related diseases is well
established, hearings have been held to determine the relationship
between asbestos and colon or laryngeal cancer, as it is not clear
to what extent, if any, asbestos contributes to development of
these diseases. In other types of cases, scientific evidence based
15 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, (1993). In
Daubert, the Court ended conflict in the lower courts and held that theFrye
"general acceptance" standard was superseded by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Id. at 587. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence "the trial
judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is
not only relevant but reliable." Id. at 589. See also FED. R. EvID. 702
(1984).
16 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997). In Joiner, a case of
first impression, the Court decided that abuse of discretion was the correct
standard of review for expert testimony. Id. at 519. "[Wjhile the Federal
Rules of Evidence allow district courts to admit a somewhat broader range of
scientific testimony than would have been admissible underFo'e, they leave in
place the 'gatekeeper' role for the trial judge in screening such evidence." Id.
" Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia held that "while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field
in which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
1999
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on animal studies or toxicology has been held to be insufficient to
be admissible or to sustain jury verdicts."8
IV. PRODUCT IDENTIFICATION
Where there is a long period of time between exposure
ingestion of a toxic substance and manifestation of injury or
disease, i.e. a long latency period, product identification often
presents the most difficult hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome.
Several states have adopted a market share theory for DES cases
because each company's product is identical or the product is
fungible. 19 Market share was developed as a means of avoiding a
finding of concerted action or alternative liability,20 the older
theories on which plaintiffs relied. However, many states have
nof accepted market share even in DES cases. Plaintiffs have
been unsuccessful in persuading courts to adopt market share for
asbestos,2' at least in part because the asbestos containing
18 Joiner, 118 S. Ct. at 519. See also Brock v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 874 F.2d 307, modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989); In re
Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985);
Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1988).
'9 Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E.2d 1069, 541
N.Y.S.2d 941 (1989). In Hymowitz, the court adopted a market share theory
using a national market. Id. The theory apportioned liability so as to conform
to the over-all culpability of each defendant, measured by the amount of risk of
injury each defendant created to the public at large. Id. The court reasoned
that this was a fair method to provide plaintiffs with the equitable relief that
they deserve, while also reasonably distributing the responsibility for the
plaintiffs' injuries among defendants. Id. at 511, 539 N.E.2d at 1077, 541
N.Y.S.2d at 949. See also Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 607 P.2d 924 (1980).
20 Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450
N.Y.S.2d 776, (1982). Concerted action liability rests upon the principle that
"[a]ll those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a
tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or
who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts
done for his benefit, are equally liable to him." (quoting PROSSER, TORTS §
46, at 292 4th ed. 1971).
21 Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1990). In
Robertson, the court held that the plaintiff in a products liability action bears
the burden of demonstrating that a specific defendant is responsible for the
692 [Vol 15
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products are so varied. The only nationally reported exception
involves denial of summary judgment in a brake lining case
where discreet but fungible asbestos containing products were
allegedly involved.' Market share has been rejected in breast
implant cases on the ground that the products are different and
the manufacturer is usually identifiable.2
Product identification is the single most challenging aspect of
the asbestos litigation. How can a plaintiff who has been exposed
to asbestos containing products twenty to forty years later prove
that a particular product manufactured by a particular defendant
caused his injuries? In my court, trial ready cases are currently
clustered in groups of eighty per month, with two months,
November and May devoted to in extremis (dying plaintiffs)
cases. Before each cluster comes up for trial, defendants
claiming lack of product identification inundate me with summary
judgment motions. The appellate courts have not always been
consistent in their determination of what constitutes sufficient
circumstantial evidence of exposure to a particular product.24 So
far, no court in New York has gone as far as an Ohio Court5 in
rejecting the need to show either close proximity or a substantial
length of time of exposure. The Ohio court in Horton v. Harwick
harm alleged. Id at 366. Since the proof of causation requires two elements;
proof of cause in fact and proximate cause, where the relevant facts show
either that the defendant was not responsible for the injury, or that the causal
connection between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury is
remote, the question of causation is decided by the court. Id. at 366. See also
White v. Celotex, 907 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1990).
1 Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1152, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d
109 (1992).
1 Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 898 F.2d 146 (4th Cir. 1990); In re New
York State Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 166 Misc. 2d 85, 631 N.Y.S.2d
491 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1995).
24 Compare Diel v. Flintkote, 204 A.D.2d 53, 611 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Ist Dep't.
1994) and Cawein v. Flintkote, 203 A.D.2d 105, 610 N.Y.S.2d 487 (1st
Dep't. 1994) with Dollas v. W.R. Grace & Co., 224 A.D.2d 319, 639
N.Y.S.2d 323 (1st Dep't. 1996).
1 Horton v. Harwick Chemical Corp., 653 N.E.2d 1196 (Ohio 1995).
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Chemical Corporation accepted a fiber drift theory, i.e., that
asbestos fibers could drift a substantial distance to cause injury. 26
V. LOOKING BACKWARD AND FORWARD IN
PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES
Some of the other important product liability issues that affect
mass torts include the liability of successor corporations for the
wrongs of predecessors, the extent to which a bulk seller of raw
materials may be held liable, and the extent of the duty owed. In
effect, how far back and how far forward can liability extend?
Oftentimes, there have been changes in corporate ownership of
defendants by the time a product liability case is brought. In
mass torts, particularly those involving long latency periods, the
issue of successor liability is often key to prosecution of the
action. The New York rule is that an acquiring corporation is not
liable for the tort obligations of its predecessor unless it expressly
or impliedly assumes the predecessor's liabilities; however,
successor liability may be imposed if there was a consolidation or
merger of seller and purchaser, the purchasing corporation was a
mere continuation of the selling corporation, or the transaction
was entered into fraudulently to escape such obligations.27 In the
seminal case Schumacher v. Richards Shear, Inc., a successor
corporation was held not liable for an allegedly defective piece of
machinery that caused an employee to become blind in one eye
21where the original manufacturer survived as a distinct entity.
Although Schumacher seemingly rejected it, a recent decision of
the Appellate Division Third Department has apparently adopted
the product line exception. In Hart v. Bruno Machinery Corp.,
the court affirmed an order by the Supreme Court denying
defendants' motion for summary judgment in an action based on
successor corporation theory where the original manufacturer no
26 Id.
27 See generally Schumacher v Richards Shear Co., Inc., 59 N.Y.2d 239,
451 N.E.2d 195, 464 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1983); New York City Asbestos
Litigation, 144 Misc. 2d 42 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1989).
' Shumacher, 59 N.Y.2d at 245, 451 N.E.2d at 198, 464 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
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longer existed.29 The court found there was a material issue of
fact as to whether the defendants should be held liable for
continuation of a leather embossing press product line, and
signaled that it was receptive to expanding the exceptions to
successor liability to insure that a responsible manufacturer will
be available to compensate injured plaintiffs."
New York has also rejected a look back to the bulk seller of
raw materials, where the end product not the substance itself was
in fact the culprit. In the silicone gel breast implant cases, Dow
Chemical Corporation, the bulk supplier of a silicone compound
was found not liable to ultimate consumers based on the absence
of a duty to an end user to test for toxicity of the compound, even
where it may have been known what the end use would be. 3 The
same court went further in another case,32 holding that the
sophisticated user or learned intermediary doctrine served as a
bar to lawsuits against the bulk seller of raw materials.
New York has determined with respect to DES cases that there
is a generational limit concerning to whom the duty exists.
Ingestion by a mother of DES during pregnancy may cause
uterine malformation in female offspring. When such a daughter
herself becomes pregnant, that malformation may cause a
premature birth with concomitant neurological impairment in the
newborn. The Court of Appeals majority, with a strong dissent
by Judge Stewart Hancock, found that the drug manufacturer's
9 Hart v. Bruno Machinery Corp., 679 N.Y.S.2d 740 (3d Dep't 1998). In
Hart, the original manufacturer T.W. & C.B. Sheridan Company sold its
entire business - good will and all - to defendant Harris-Intertype Corporation,
becoming a wholly owned subsidiary thereof, and was subsequently merged
into the parent company. Id. at 741-42. See also Rothstein v. Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Co., 174 Misc. 2d 437, 664 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1997) (holding that corporate defendant could be liable under "product line"
exception to general rule against holding corporate successor liable for
predecessor's torts).30 Hart, 679 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
31 New York State Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 166 Misc.2d 299, 632
N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup Ct. New York County 1995),aftd, 227 A.D.2d 310, 642
N.Y.S.2d 68 (1st Dep't. 1996).
32 Banks v. Dow Coming Corp. published at 6 MEALEY's LIGATION
REPORTER # 12, BREAsT IMPLANTS, Index No. 111133/94 (1998).
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duty did not extend to the third generation, the premature,
neurologically impaired infant.
33
VI. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
New York was the 41st state in the United States to abandon
date of exposure or ingestion as the starting date for the running
of the statute of limitations. In 1986, the enactment of CPLR
214-c abrogated the date of exposure rule enunciated in 1936,1
4
that had effectively barred most of these claims. Under CPLR
214-c the statute runs from date of manifestation of injury or
disease, with a possible one-year extension where cause of the
injury or disease was neither known nor knowable. Additionally,
Ch. 682 N.Y.-Laws of 1986, revived previously time barred
claims for five toxic substances, including asbestos and DES, for
a period of one year. Dioxins (Agent Orange) claims had been
previously revived pursuant to CPLR 214-b. A subsequent
amendment to 214-c provided for revival of silicone gel breast
implant claims. The Court of Appeals, found the revival statute
constitutional, 35 and held that an individual exposed prior to the
statute's inception but whose disease manifested itself subsequent
to the enactment was covered by CPLR 214-c.36 At the same
time it refused to apply CPLR 214-c to loss of consortium claims
for spouses who were not married at the time of the exposure, but
31were married at the time that the injuries manifested themselves.
The Court of Appeals also found that CPLR 214-c did not
apply to repetitive stress injury cases, as keyboards were not
toxic substances, but fashioned a compromise. The Court
13 Enright v. Eli Lilly Co., 77 N.Y.2d 377, 570 N.E.2d 198, 568 N.Y.S.2d
550 (1994).
4 Schmidt v. Merchant's Desp. Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824
(1936).
" Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly Co, 73 N.Y.2d 487, 539 N.E. 1069, 541 N.Y.S.2d
941 (1989).
36 Rothstein Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 87 N.Y.2d 90, 661 N.E.2d 146,
637 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1995).
17 Consorti v. Owens-Coming Fibreglas Corp., 86 N.Y.2d 449, 657 N.E.2d
1301, 634 N.Y.S.2d 18, (1995).
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determined that the statute of limitations began to run from the
date of last usage or the date that injury first manifested itself,
whichever was earlier. 38
VII. TWO INJURY RULE
CPLR 214-c did not address the situation where some injury or
disease is manifest, but a more serious injury is not yet present.
Does the statute of limitations bar an action for a serious injury
disease where a plaintiff failed to bring a timely action when a
milder disease manifested itself? For example, does an asbestos
victim who did not sue for pleural plaque or mild asbestosis, lose
out if he develops mesothelioma, a virulent cancer caused by
asbestos exposure? Or, is a breast implant plaintiff precluded
from suing for a systemic injury if she failed to timely sue for a
local injury such as capsular contraction? If such a plaintiff is
barred, then does the mildly injured plaintiff have a cause of
action for risk of cancer? What about fear of cancer or fear of
systemic injury? Some states, including Illinois, Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania, have established pleural registries or inactive
dockets whereby the statute of limitations is tolled and cases are
put on the shelf so to speak, with the right to return to the active
docket upon demonstration that serious disease or injury is
manifest. New York, has instead become a "two injury" state.39
A plaintiff may bring an action for a milder or specific disease
caused by the toxic substance or may forego the right to bring
such an action. In either event, the plaintiff is not precluded from
suing again when the more serious injury develops. The statute
of limitation for the second injury does not start to run until the
second disease becomes manifest. For that reason, the plaintiff is
as Blanco v. AT&T Co., 90 N.Y.2d 757, 689 N.E.2d 506, 666 N.Y.S.2d
536 (1997); See also Edmond v. IBM Corp., 91 N.Y.2d 949, 694 N.E.2d
438, 671 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1998) (holding that aggravation of a pre-existing
injury was an independent cause of action in a repetitive stress injury case).
39 Fusaro v. Porter Hayden Co., 145 Misc. 2d 911, 548 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup.
Ct. New York County 1989), aft'd, 170 A.D.2d 239, 565 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1st
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precluded from seeking damages for risk of developing the
serious disease in the first action; although, if there is a rational
basis for it, the plaintiff may still claim damages for fear of
disease.40
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a judge handling mass tort cases is confronted
with numerous product liability issues, including case
management, choice of laws and theories of liability, scientific
causation, product identification, trial management and utilization
of alternate dispute resolution techniques, and statutes of
limitations, all of which contribute to making such litigation both
challenging and exciting.
40 Fusaro, 145 Misc. 2d at 916, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
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